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It is widely agreed that the events which took place on 11 September 2001 have played 
a large part in reshaping global imaginings about contemporary acts of terrorism and 
its Islamic perpetrators. Given this transformation in the understanding of terrorism 
and terrorists our objective in this paper is threefold. First we want to present a 
discussion of the roots of the kind of neo-liberal politics that has grown up alongside 
acts of terrorism and its global media coverage which has, we argue, resulted in a 
politics of fear that acts to legitimate ever increasing legislative controls. In an attempt 
to reveal how discourse works to support such regulation, in the second part of this 
paper we offer a qualitative analysis of newspaper articles from the UK about acts of 
terrorism that have taken place since the suicide bombings on the London transport 
system on 7 July 2005. Together with an analysis of the political speeches of Bush 
and Blair, we examine how far these current discourses can be said to have reframed 
notions of inclusion/exclusion for Muslim populations. Finally we present a discussion 
of the consequences of such terrorist acts and their varied representations for the 
future of the British multicultural imaginary. 
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The Political Economy of Global Terrorism 
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Although it is possible to argue that transnational terror networks existed in the late 
1960s through to the early 1970s, and refer to famous examples such as the siege of 
Entebbe and groups such as Terror International which comprised terrorist cells from 
Palestine, Germany, and Italy (Hoffman, 2006), it is our contention in this paper that 
this networked terrorism did not have the same kind of impact on our everyday sense 
of security as contemporary Islamic terrorism. However, it is difficult to explain why 
this is the case. It is well recorded that the IRA was supported and funded by 
international networks. They received financial support from American backers and 
famously obtained military hardware from Libya in the 1980s. The internationalism of 
Palestinian terrorists is similarly well known if we consider the events of Munich 1972 
when Black September terrorists seized members of the Israeli Olympic team. This 
episode ended in the massacre of the athletes and prolonged Israeli reprisals against 
key members of the Palestinian organisation Fatah. But despite the fact that this event 
took place on the biggest world stage, and transplanted the politics of Israel-Palestine 
into a European setting, there was little sense that the everyday lives of non-Israeli-
Palestinians were under threat from terror networks lurking in our midst. What, then, 
is new about the new terrorism1 unleashed by 9/11?  
 
It is our contention that the reason the events of Entebbe and Munich did not strike 
fear into the hearts of the general populace was because processes of globalisation 
were not yet in full swing. It would be a mistake to suggest that these processes were 
not taking place in the 1970s, but what we can say is that there was still a sense in 
                                                 
1 For a discussion of the evolution of new terrorism see Laquer (1999), who argues that new terrorism 
is characterised by a move toward ‘fanatical’ belief systems and access to weapons of mass 




which the condition of world shrinking, which David Harvey (1991) discusses in his 
book on post-modernism, was only just beginning to have an effect on the everyday 
lives of the general populace. Perhaps what happened in the 1970s – which 
transformed terrorism from a globalised networked phenomenon that was not 
understood as such by the masses, to a globalised networked phenomenon, which 
the masses could not only recognise but actively over-estimate thus boosting the 
terrorists’ project to strike fear into the hearts of the masses – was that political 
decisions were made in Britain and America that began the process of neo-liberal 
capitalist globalisation that we live with today. The key term here is neo-liberalism. In 
his later book, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (2005), Harvey demonstrates how the 
forerunners of neo-liberalism collapsed the liberal ideas of freedom and democracy 
into capitalist principles of the freedom to make money without state interference and 
the democratic right of everybody to pursue whatever means necessary to realise their 
own life projects inside a capitalist framework. 
 
Further to this, Harvey explains that neo-liberal ideology emerged in response to the 
crisis of capitalism that took place in the 1970s. On the one hand western leaders felt 
that they were being held hostage by the OPEC nations who refused to ship oil to 
supporters of Israel in the Yom Kippur War (Rabinovich, 2005). The effect of the 
embargo was to cause the price of oil to rise and the western economies, so reliant on 
oil to maintain capitalism, to begin to slow down2.  
                                                 
2 In order to situate this idea we can look to Edward Said who, as part of his trilogy on the construction 
of Islam in western discourse, has demonstrated that the ensuing oil crisis was central to our 
contemporary understanding of Arabic-Islamic relations with the west:  
 
…before the sudden OPEC price rises in early 1974, ‘Islam’ as such scarcely figured either 
in the culture or in the media… But the dramatically higher cost of imported oil soon 
became associated in the public mind with a cluster of unpleasant things: American 
dependence on imported oil (which was usually referred to as ‘being at the mercy of foreign 
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This tension exposes the second problem facing western capitalism in the 1970s: the 
strength of the labour movement and ever-increasing demands for higher wages and 
better conditions. Together these two conditions – the oil crisis and the strength of 
labour – undermined capitalism and began to compromise the ability of business to 
extract profit from the economy. That the oil crisis occurred in response to the Yom 
Kippur War between Israel and a coalition of Arabic states led by Egypt and Syria, and 
the core problem of terrorism to this day arguably remains the Israel-Palestine 
situation, is no coincidence. The connection of these events reveals the complex 
political economy of contemporary terrorism. That is to say that the political situation 
of Israel-Palestine was directly linked to both global terrorism – which the western 
public were not yet aware of as a threat to their everyday life – and the rise of neo-
liberal political ideology – which occurred as a result of the Arabic response to the 
Arab-Israeli Wars in the Middle East and eventually gave rise to a new sensitivity to 
globalised terrorism.   
 
However, in order to combat the difficult situation in the Middle East the western 
capitalist economies took steps to radicalise the relationship between business and 
labour in favour of capitalists. The effect of this process, which developed through the 
1970s and 1980s, was to pass the OPEC problem through the western class system 
so that it was no longer western capitalists who were squeezed by the increased oil 
price, but rather the western working classes who saw wages cut, job insecurity 
increase, and social security provisions slashed3. The overall effect of the emergence 
                                                 
oil producers’); the apprehension that intransience was being communicated from the 
Persian Gulf region to individual Americans; above all a signal – as if from a new, hitherto 
unidentified force – saying that energy was no longer ‘ours’ for the taking (1981: 33). 
 
3 Herein resides the famous triumvirate of reforms usually seen to comprise neo-liberal political-
economic programmes (Harvey, 2005; Beck, 2002). First, the state cuts back on public ownership of 
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of neo-liberalism was to radically alter the balance of power between capitalists and 
workers in the major western powers.  This may then explain why, the other members 
of the Terror International movement4, comprised of German and Italian Marxists, 
found common cause with the Palestinian radicals. Whereas the latter group were 
concerned with the political situation in the Middle East, the former group were 
opposed to the related transformations taking place in the western capitalist 
economies. That these group’s explicit ideology reflected a kind of violent Frankfurt 
School neo-Marxism set on opposition to soulless western consumerism should not 
lead us to believe that their connection to the Palestinians was simply a marriage of 
convenience. On the contrary the two struggles, for Palestinian statehood and 
workers’ freedoms, were intimately linked through the confrontation between the major 
oil producing countries and the western capitalist economies that remained 
determined to find ways to make profits despite the crisis of accumulation caused by 
the rise in the price of oil.  
 
Fear, Anxiety, and the Construction of the War on Terror 
What we have here, then, is a discussion of a possible theory of the political-economy 
of global terrorism in the 1970s. But at this time international terrorism, produced by 
the complex relationships between Israel, the Arabic states, OPEC, and the western 
                                                 
infrastructure. Mass privatisation takes place in order to not only place enormously profitable 
businesses in the hands of private business, but also tip the balance of the capitalist-labour struggle in 
favour of business by virtue of the fact that the working classes are largely at the mercy of capitalists 
who own essential infrastructure. Second, the state deregulates capitalism, so that business is able to 
follow more or less whatever practices it deems necessary in pursuit of private profit. The related effect 
of this transformation was that western capitalists set about the destruction of unions who might oppose 
the idea of deregulated business able to hire, fire, and restructure at will. Finally, the western capitalist 
states pulled the rug out from under the feet of the workers who had previously fought business on the 
basis that they could fall back on social security if they found themselves out of work. 
4 The notion of ‘terror international’ was explored on the BBC documentary ‘Age of Terror’ written by 
journalist Peter Taylor. For further discussion of the complex relationship between radical terrorist 
organisations see Hoffman (2006). 
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capitalisms, was not experienced by the western public as a threat to their everyday 
lives. At this time suicide bombers and hijacked airplanes remained a remote threat 
for most people. Instead, terrorism was understood in political terms, rather than as 
the kind of generalised phenomenon currently spoken about in discourses surrounding 
the American-led ‘War on Terror’. What, then, led to the transformation of terrorism, a 
phenomenon with political actors and political agendas, into terror, a quasi-natural 
phenomenon, which appears to strike people without warning, explanation, or reason? 
We think that there are several reasons for this transformation. First, the political-
economic transformations of neo-liberalism through the 1970s and 1980s produced a 
new sense of generalised insecurity in the everyday lives of the masses in the major 
capitalist states, but more especially Britain and America. Bauman (2006) recently 
spoke about this generalised sense of uncertainty and insecurity in terms of liquid fear. 
Following on from Beck’s (1992) articulation of the risk society, another term we might 
use to reflect the new state of uncertainty surrounding the very things of everyday life, 
such as job security, the ability to maintain a home, and provide for one’s family, would 
be anxiety. Anxiety is a useful term to refer to in this context, because what this 
concept means is a kind of fluid or ambient sense of uncertainty or unease. The 
anxious person knows that there is a threat lurking somewhere in the vicinity, but is 
unable to pin down its exact location (Salecl, 1994). Further to this in his 2007 book 
on the complex relationship between utopia and dystopia, Featherstone (2007) shows 
how the term fear extends the idea of anxiety by describing what happens when we 
attach an object to our sense of uncertainty. We fear a particular object. In this respect 
what Bauman’s term liquid fear refers to is a constantly shifting sense of fear whereby 
we continually attach new objects to our ambient feelings of uncertainty in order to 
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cope with them better. It is possible to handle fear. Anxiety is much more difficult to 
stand. 
 
In this regard we want to suggest that the specific problem of contemporary 
(Islamicised) global terror emerged in response to the generalised anxieties produced 
by neo-liberalism and the consequent spread of the precariousness of everyday life 
through the capitalist economies. Here we argue that the originators of neoliberal 
ideology, America and Britain, also form the vanguard of the so-called war on terror5. 
The reason for this is that these nations comprise the populations that are most 
exposed to the vague uncertainties of neo-liberal capitalism and therefore have most 
need to find objects to carry their sense of anxiety. It is these objects that are 
conveniently provided by radicalised representatives of populations who have been 
dispossessed and exploited in far off parts of the world by military neo-liberal 
interventions into strategic sites of capital importance on the world map. The presence 
of the ideological short-circuit that occurs in order to screen out neo-liberalism and 
provide a direct link between anxiety and terror is illustrated by the contemporary 
American usage of the term ‘terror’ that has largely been taken up by the western 
                                                 
5 Our argument is therefore that these anxieties found face in the Islamic other because it was Radical 
Islam that most obstinately resisted the drive to globalise and accumulate of the newly neo-liberalised 
nations, America and Britain, in a part of the world, the Middle East, that was, and remains of enormous 
strategic importance of the vitality of the capitalist economy. The relationship between neo-liberal 
capitalism and global terror is, therefore, a complex one that we contend has several inter-linked 
dimensions. First the neo-liberal political elites’ pursuit of a policy of what Retort (2005) call ‘military 
neo-liberalism’ in updating Marx’s theory of primitive accumulation in order to maintain the vitality of an 
economic system that always runs on the edge of collapse. Second the emergence of a generalised 
anxiety in the populations of the neo-liberalised nations as a result of the precariousness of everyday 
life. Third the promotion of Radical Islam as a terroristic ideology by virtue of the colonialism of western 
military neo-liberalism. And finally the ideological short-circuit of domestic precariousness and the 
promotion of radical Islamic terrorism in the notion of apolitical terror that screens out the effects of neo-
liberal capitalism on both domestic and foreign populations and transforms the issue of terrorism into a 
moral battle between good and evil or the believers in progress and development and those fanatics 
who want to live in the past. For evidence of this thesis, which we can only suggest because we are 
making a political claim, it is clear that the originators of neoliberal ideology, America and Britain, also 
form the vanguard of the so-called war on terror. 
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media. The idea of terror is important because it suggests a kind of liminal state. What 
does terror refer to in real terms? It refers to the feelings of terror experienced by the 
terrorised person, but it is not immediately clear where these feelings originate. Here 
we think that one can detect the vague neo-liberal anxiety experienced by the 
populations of western capitalisms. However, because the real root of these feelings 
is never properly articulated, or was not properly articulated until the global financial 
collapse and the onset of global recession, our thesis is that they are projected onto a 
fearful other, the Islamic terrorist, who happens to be caught up in the same economic 
complex of dispossession and exploitation.  
 
The problem with the term ‘terrorism’, then, is that it locates the feelings of terror too 
concretely in the actions of particular people who one is then compelled to try to 
understand in relation to one’s own actions. Paletz and Vinson (1992) suggested that 
the effect of this process of politicisation of the actions of terrorists in relation to one’s 
own actions, would be to enable one to better understand the situation at hand in order 
to try to resolve the conflict. However, this is not an option in the current global situation 
because it does not serve the interests of those in charge of the major powers to try 
to resolve the problem of terrorism by addressing its root causes because this would 
suggest rolling back processes of military neo-liberalism. Furthermore, the result of 
politicising the war on terror would be to enable the western powers’ populations to 
understand that the real root of their undefined feelings of anxiety is not terror, but 
rather the generalised insecurity that their own governments have caused them to 
have to endure in support of neo-liberal capitalism and the demand to produce endless 
surplus profit. What we have here then is a classic case of ideological diversion or 
false consciousness. The real problem today is globalised Anglo-American neo-liberal 
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capitalism, which not only causes massive anxiety amongst the populations of the 
western capitalist countries causing them to target all outsiders through a form of 
radical capitalistic nationalism, but also produces massive numbers of terrorists willing 
to fight and die for their own countries that have been consistently abused by the neo-
liberal system. The twist here is that the political leaders of the western capitalist 
powers have found ways to make use of acts of terrorism to deflect attention from the 
problem of capitalism and continue to try to employ this strategy less successfully in 
the face of global economic meltdown that should really reveal the root cause of 
Islamic terrorism. Herein resides the second reason for the transformation of the 
terrorist into pure terror. In the politics of fear the enemy is not a political system, but 
rather terror and the fanatical terrorist, who is presented as a monstrous other 
incapable of reason. Here we can see that over the past forty years the notion of 
‘Islamic Fundamentalism’ embedded in countless news reports and political rhetoric 
has provided the perfect foil for the west. Here we can argue that the presentation of 
a totally non-politicised struggle between good and evil is perfect cover for the 
generalised insecurity produced by neo-liberalism.  
 
Terrorism and Media: A Symbiotic Relationship 
In order to unpack how a non-politicised and individualised discourse on terrorism 
became the dominant discourse for understanding what we might call neo-colonial 
war, we need to consider how the spectacular, mass mediated, effects of the new 
terrorism, which came to public attention on September 11 2001, have impacted upon 
politics in America and Britain, especially since 7/7. Cementing the notion of a new 
form of terrorism, for Norris, Kern and Just ‘the Al Qaeda operations [brought] a new 
form of terrorism to the world’ (2003: 3). However, the new kind of terrorism that they 
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refer to here is not the organised, global threat of al Qaeda itself, but rather the 
extended emotional-political consequence of terrorist attacks: the public perception of 
threat that in turn evolves into the justification for new restrictive legislation. For 
example, shortly after the attacks on the Twin Towers, in the US the department for 
Homeland Security was formed, while the much criticised Patriot Act is a much talked 
about consequence of the violent destruction of the World Trade Centre (Etzioni, 
2004). In the UK we have seen similar legislative changes. Shortly after both 9/11 and 
the London bombings four years later, the UK Terrorism Bill was revised and there 
have been waves of legislation since which critics suggest have reduced the liberties 
of ordinary citizens6. If this is the case then the real question must be why the public 
has allowed these political changes to take place? The likely answer to this question 
resides in our earlier discussion of what Giroux (2004) has called the terroristic nature 
of the neo-liberal system itself. This idea suggests that given that many people already 
feel embattled by the insecure nature of everyday life, it is easy for them take the next 
step and translate those feelings of anxiety into fears about the heinous schemes of 
particular enemies and reluctantly accept new legislation which will reduce the liberty 
of every citizen. The standard response to the ‘reduction of liberty’ argument is to 
suggest that first such punitive legislation is required to ensure the continuation of ‘our 
way of life’ and second that such disciplinary regulation will only impact upon those 
guilty of terrorism. This view has been only too forthcoming from consecutive 
                                                 
6 The Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 quickly introduced after 9/11 controversially saw the 
use of HM Prison Belmarsh as a ‘holding’ compound for the lengthy detention of terrorist suspects 
without trial. While The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 sought to deal with the illegality of this previous 
move, DWT was instead replaced with control orders, which allowed for electronic tagging and house 
arrest for those suspected of terrorist acts or associations with suspected terrorists. For a discussion of 
this see Sivanandan (2006). Also on the wider implications of these Acts see Fekete (2006). 
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governments – left and right – only too happy to respond to the fears of the electorate 
by offering up a succession of new anti-terrorism / immigration legislation. 
 
What is it, then, that underwrites our willingness to defer to central authority and 
accept, or even celebrate, the passage of punitive legislation? While there has indeed 
been a significant minority of UK citizens willing to confront the consequences of 
terrorism – harsher immigration legislation and the war in Iraq for example - following 
the arguments of authors like Bauman (2002) and Furedi (2006) we believe that the 
answer to this question is that the emergence of the new politics of fear has created a 
situation whereby citizens would consent to almost anything in order to escape the 
possibility that they will become the next victims of global terror. Here, Bauman tells 
us that, ‘the dangers we fear most are immediate; understandably, we also wish the 
remedies to be immediate – ‘quick fixes’, offering relief on the spot, like off-the-shelf 
painkillers’ (2006: 114). In this respect the constantly looping spectacle of the Twin 
Towers collapsing on the world’s TV screens has had a profound and sustainable 
effect, probably far beyond anything the architects of the attacks could have imagined. 
That is, the spectacle has become embedded in our contemporary collective 
unconscious. 
 
Again, it is perhaps no coincidence that the effects of this singular event had the most 
impact in America, the victim of the attack, and Britain, which continues to stand 
‘shoulder to shoulder’ with its transatlantic neighbour in the endless war on terror, 
simply because these two nations are also at the forefront of the neo-liberal revolution. 
Thus we suggest that what has really taken place in the wake of 9/11 is that new 
terrorism has become a convenient container for the pre-existing anxieties of the 
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American and British populations subject to the total instability of the neo-liberal 
system, one which the political leaders of these two nations have exploited, and 
expanded, even in the face of financial collapse. As we will show in the sections that 
follow, the result of the media and political discourse surrounding the terrorist threat 
has been to focus the populations’ anxieties on a more or less identifiable enemy, the 
Islamic terrorist, the architect of terror (see Morone, 2004).  
 
In this situation it is clear that the mass media plays a central role. There is, of course, 
nothing new about asserting the relationship between the mass media and terrorism, 
arguably because the exponents of ‘the war of the flea’ have become reliant on media 
spectacle to spread terror beyond the immediate vicinity of their attacks. It is 
recognition of this symbiotic relationship between media and terror that leads Hoffman 
(2006) to argue that it was no accident that modern terrorism was born with the first in 
a series of Palestinian highjackings in 1968, for it was the same year that America 
launched its first television satellite, able to beam the event around the world. Further 
to this, Hoffman suggests that following 1968, it was no coincidence that American 
citizens were targeted by terrorist organisations; for to target US citizens guaranteed 
mass media exposure. Seeming to support Jenkins’ influential idea that ‘terrorism is 
theatre’ (Jenkins, 1978), the days and weeks after 9/11 were mapped by what Kellner 
(2004) has called ‘spectacles of terror’. Following the work of Baudrillard (2001), he 
suggests that the images of the Twin Towers collapsing drew us into a heightened 
state of emergency readily seized upon by the American media.  
 
In line with such postmodern ideas, the central premise of the contemporary terror 
network is that it is unofficial, fluid, and impossible to pin down. However, this liquid 
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form causes problems for processes of the mass mediatisation of terrorism. That is to 
say that the terrorist needs to remain invisible to the eyes of the world until the correct 
time to appear occurs, but that the secretive nature of the terrorist cell is always under 
threat from the glare of the media. In light of this complex, we can see that it is true 
that even though the terrorist needs to remain secreted and out of sight, they also rely 
on the media for maximum exposure. In a sense the media coverage validates their 
actions through the creation of terror in the wider population (Schmid and de Graf, 
1982; Paletz and Vinson, 1992). On the mass media’s side, it is impossible to consider 
not providing terrorists with publicity, however clearly one understands that mass 
mediatisation is part of the terrorists’ overall strategy.  
 
In contrast to today’s political courting of media / terror publicity, in the 1980s the British 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher famously talked about ‘cutting off the oxygen of the 
media’ in relation to IRA attacks on mainland Britain. Thatcher made this proclamation 
in 1988 when Home Secretary Douglas Hurd announced the prohibition of publicity for 
certain Sinn Fein members7. But this refusal of publicity would, of course, have been 
unthinkable, let alone undoable for the British press. It would have been inconceivable 
to ignore terrorist acts, if not simply because such events sell newspapers, then for 
the sake of democratic process. The other factor to consider is what the real effect of 
a ban on the reportage of terrorist acts would have been on the political elites, who as 
we have already seen, make use of constructions of the other to maintain their 
ideological power over the masses (Furedi, 2006)8.  
                                                 
7 This refers to the ban on broadcasting Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams’ voice and the controversial (and 
for those that remember it, somewhat comical) means by which the media got around the ban via the 
use of voice-over artists. See Irvin (1992) for a discussion of this point. 
8 In the case of Thatcherite Britain, which was in the process of neo-liberal revolution in the 1980s, it is 
hard to imagine that it would have been a positive move for the supporters of the new capitalism to take 
terrorism off our screens, because this would have exposed the new capitalism to criticism and 
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This is perhaps even more relevant to the case of the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, because the enemy in these instances were less 
identifiable with the core population of British society. In other words, the contemporary 
terrorist enemy is connected to the explicitly racialised other (Said, 1978). This is quite 
different from the more complex discursive shift necessary to link IRA terrorism to 
notions of ethnic otherness through the evasion of the Irish question rooted in the 
‘troubles’ in the political history of British colonialism. This new situation plays to both 
the innate racism of the British press and public (one only has to look at the media 
coverage of immigration and asylum over recent years9) and has the benefit of more 
or less removing the other from home territories. However, 7/7 changed all that. In this 
case the suicide bombers were British born – the enemy within, rather than foreign 
others (where we have been conditioned into seeing images of carnage and 
destruction). How then are we to reconcile the 7/7 attacks with our usual discursive 
construction of the terrorist as (foreign) ethnic other?  
 
Reporting Islam after 7/7 
Up until this point we have spent some time discussing the historical roots of 
contemporary terrorism, the politics of fear, and the relationship between terrorism and 
the media. We now want to turn our attention to recent examples of the British media 
                                                 
potentially reinvigorated the failing socialist left. Given that terrorism functions as a container for wider 
anxieties of the populace it is, therefore, difficult to see what cutting off the terrorists’ oxygen would have 
achieved then or would achieve today. As Hoffman (2006) argues, in a slightly different vein, despite 
the symbiotic relationship between terrorist and media, the publicity they supply is rarely, if ever, 
positive. What then are the politicians worried about? In fact it would be perhaps more realistic to say 
that contemporary governments court media coverage of terrorist attacks precisely because they know 
that the subsequent media discourse is likely to fall on the side of the state by virtue of the kind of 
connections Chomsky (2002) discusses in his famous theory of propaganda and that they will be able 
to manipulate the politics of fear in order to subdue their populations struck by anxieties about everyday 
life under capitalism. 
9 The report by Moore, Mason, and Lewis (2008) at the Cardiff School of Journalism, Media and Cultural 
Studies, provides an excellent overview and analysis of media representations of Muslims in the UK. 
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construction of Islam and Muslims in order to unpack some of the debates about what 
we have described as the neoliberal condition of fear and anxiety. To this end we 
undertook a qualitative analysis of 61 newspaper articles from The Guardian, The 
Times, The Daily Mail and The Sun and their sister Sunday newspapers to provide a 
broad range of published opinion from a variety of political positions (and taking 
account of the readership of these papers). We took a case study approach selecting  
the trial of British Muslim Mohammed Atif Siddique who was accused and convicted 
of activities relating to terrorism over the period August – October 2007 (first article 
25th April, last 8th December with most activity taking place in August and September 
during the trial and conviction). This approach allowed us to include all articles on this 
case (42 in total) so a comprehensive analysis could be made10. However, we also felt 
it was important to include coverage of some of the most prominent new stories 
involving terrorist acts post 7/7. We, therefore, gathered further evidence from 
coverage of the Glasgow airport attack in June 2007 in an attempt to highlight the role 
that discourse has played in more recent constructions of radical Islamic terrorism (19 
articles in total from all papers randomly selected using the search terms Glasgow, 
bomb and 2007, giving us 61 articles overall). 
 
Previous extensive research into the representations of Muslims/Islam demonstrates 
how British Muslims have been excluded from definitions of the ‘Islamic terrorist’ unlike 
their global counterparts (Poole. 2002, 2006). Further analysis post 9/11 (Poole 2006, 
2007)  reveals a huge shift toward media constructions that locate the British born 
Muslim within this conceptualization. Yet until the events of 7/7 that threat had 
                                                 
10 We consulted: the Mail and Mail on Sunday, 15 articles, The Sun and  News of the World, 10 articles, 
The Times and Sunday Times, 11 articles, The Guardian and Observer, 6 articles. Pre 9/11 the liberal 
press reported more on British Muslims, but the increased coverage of terrorism now fits more neatly 
within a conservative ideological framework. 
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remained at a distance, on foreign soil. After the London bombings, however, there 
was a massive increase in coverage of the British born violent extremist, of terrorist 
‘sleeper’ cells linked to al-Qaeda, and of disenchanted British Muslims following the 
invasion of Iraq (Poole, 2006). News reports following key events after 7/7 illustrate 
the conflict between an absolutist anti-terrorist discourse and the need to present an 
idea of inclusion in post-Macpherson Britain11. We will elaborate on this argument and 
how it becomes evident through the analysis of media coverage below. 
 
By looking at previous scholarly work on the construction of the Islamic other (for 
example Said, 1978; Poole, 2002), we can see that there are a number of characters 
evident in the construction of Muslims. Whilst drawing on Orientalism, images of British 
Muslims have been more diverse, perhaps because this was necessary for 
maintaining harmonious social relations within a specific national context (Poole, 
2002). In the media constructions after the 7/7 attacks it has been more necessary to 
mark out the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims (we will discuss this further later on in the paper) 
and use alternative strategies for Othering. The central protagonists in this discourse 
include the respectable Muslim, friends and family of the accused, the misguided loner 
(the accused), and the evil mentor, all longstanding ‘storybook’ characters in 
ideologies of terror. The construction of the evil mentor is straightforward and one-
dimensional, continuing the Orientalist discourse of the foreign extremist polluting 
Britain. While often displayed through a discourse of national security – i.e. controlling 
immigration and maintaining secure borders – the character assassination of foreign 
Muslim clerics or imams stepped up a gear post 7/7. The obvious suggestion here was 
                                                 
11 The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry by Sir William Macpherson (HMSO, 1999) popularised the concept of 
institutionalised racism and provided a framework for thinking about the move toward a multicultural 
legal ethic. See Holohan and Featherstone (2003) for further discussion of this point. 
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that the practitioners of Islamic faith were also the central source of extremist 
ideologies. However, we can see complexities in the construction of the other 
emerging if we consider the inclusive characteristics – i.e. the British citizenship and/or 
middle-class attributes – of the central actors in the post 7/7 representations examined 
here. In all UK newspaper coverage that we examined the character of the central 
actor is developed along the narrative of a previously ordinary, often non-practicing, 
individual who has lost direction and been misguided by ‘radical ideology’. The 
previously positive credentials of the protagonist, for example his educational 
achievements, as coming from a respectable family background, etc, and his 
subsequent framing as a loner who makes irrational choices has a number of effects. 
First, it divorces the individual from the collective, the wider Muslim community that 
expresses despair at the path the individual has taken. We can see this evolutionary 
process in action if we consider one of the two central actors in the Glasgow Airport 
attack, Kafeel Ahmed. While born in Bangalore, India and raised in Saudi Arabia, 
Ahmed’s inclusive status was ensured by his solid middle class background and 
apparently successful integration into British academia whilst undertaking a 
postgraduate degree in engineering. To confirm this, after the attack his cousin is 
quoted in The Sun as saying ‘but no one knows how he fell into this’ (Phillips, 4 August 
2007). His partner in the attack, Bilal Abdullah, had similarly inclusive traits. Born in 
the UK, but raised in Baghdad in a well-off medical family, Abdullah trained as a 
medical doctor before gaining employment in an NHS hospital in Glasgow. Both 
central actors in this case caused discursive problems for the British press, who were 
panicked by the prospect of importing terrorists into ‘our’ major institutions. This was 
articulated, perhaps not surprisingly, by The Daily Mail in the article ‘NHS and an Open 
Door to Terrorism’, where they claim that ‘terrorist organisations could be specifically 
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recruiting doctors because they are from a trusted profession and could slip under the 
radar of the security services’ (Martin, 3 July 2007). It is the repetition of these two 
simple ideas – individual pathology and outside influence – across several 
newspapers that has had the significant effect of allowing both central government 
and newspapers to dismiss accusations of racism and appease the Muslim community 
via a discourse of individualism, irrationality, and psychosis. 
 
This is again evident in the post 7/7 narrative which posed the question of why ordinary 
young men had become radicalized to the extent where they would willingly kill 
themselves and others. This question, and the inference of outside influence, is 
repeated across the newspapers despite ideological and high / low brow differences. 
For instance: 
 
But what turned a well-educated, hard working, middle-class man from a caring 
family man into a would-be mass murderer? (Phillips, The Sun, 4 August 2007). 
 
What makes someone take that step? What makes someone want to turn 
themselves into a human fireball and ram a jeep into an airport terminal 
building? What makes someone want to maim and kill? (Doward, Townsend 
and McDonald, The Observer, 8 July 2007). 
How could a Scottish schoolboy be transformed into a dangerous fanatic? 
(Madeley and Beavan, The Daily Mail, 18 September 2007). 
 
While the last in this set of quotes referred to Mohammed Atif Siddique, convicted in 
a separate incident of actions relating to terrorism from this general post 7/7 discourse 
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we can identify discursive struggles in the negotiation between the British born Islamist 
and the foreign other. For example, the development of psychosis becomes a common 
feature, as the defendant (Mohammed Atif Siddique) is described as ‘fixated’, 
‘obsessed’, ‘fanatical’’ an ‘oddball’, a ‘loner’. The culprits are said to have ‘identity’ 
issues that would give rise to radicalization. This is further highlighted by discursive 
strategies identifying a lack of direction or individual failings in the perpetrators of the 
attacks. However, it remains important that the individual can somehow be linked back 
to the wider ‘terror network’, thereby legitimating the political discourse of the war on 
terror. As such, the mosques and their radical foreign clerics step in to make the 
discursive leap from criminal individual to extremist ideology brought to the UK by the 
wider terrorist network, ‘the vehicle is ideology…You’ve got to address the ideology’ 
(The Observer 8th July 2007). But in concurrence with our previous analysis of neo-
liberalism and new terrorism, this ideology is not represented as a rational political 
ideology, but as an irrational religious ideology which could potentially render any 
Muslim susceptible to radicalization and therefore terrorism. Not only are acts of 
terrorism presented as irrational in terms of western liberalism, but also in terms of 
‘correct’ interpretations of the Qur-an within the Muslim community for which it must 
be accountable. Accordingly an article in The Guardian stresses that while in the past 
Muslim communities had failed to address extremist elements, now ‘Britain's Muslims 
have launched their most concerted attempt yet to win the hearts and minds of the 
public and distance themselves from the activities of violent extremists who claim to 
act in the name of their faith’ (Bunting, 9 July 2007). 
 
To this extent the suggestion is that the wider Muslim population had also become part 
of the problem in their blindness and naivety to what had been going on in their own 
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communities. Whilst primarily having the effect of homogenising Muslims, the 
secondary effect of this discourse is to place the responsibility for monitoring and 
tackling the problems of British society within specific communities thus relieving the 
authorities of blame. Here we can see how a conflict develops between the discourse 
of integration, which has become central to positioning Muslims within Britishness (and 
encourages voluntary self monitoring), and the implicit suggestion that the Muslim 
community is responsible for Britain’s problems. Ratifying this point Bechler (2006) 
argues that it demonstrates a ‘tendency to ‘Islamicise’ problems rather than face up to 
deep socio-economic challenges’. This framework of representation was evident in 
coverage of the London attacks and in the later attempted bombing of Glasgow airport. 
In this case the histories of the protagonists were scrutinised by a British media 
desperate to locate reasons for internal conflict despite the best efforts of the white 
majority and multicultural politics to secure cohesion between disparate groups. The 
fact that the protagonists in the Glasgow airport attack were university educated and 
some had gone on to work in the NHS, highlights the disjuncture between core Britain’s 
belief in itself as a tolerant, inclusive society and the level of dissatisfaction and anomie 
clearly felt by some members of this society. Here, the location of extremism in a 
foreign other is imperative to shore up the cohesion of centre or mainstream politics. 
For example, while the police and political line on the events was that they were acts 
of crime perpetrated by misguided individuals: 
 
I wish to make absolutely clear that this investigation has only ever been about 
one thing – criminality’ ‘It was not about communities or a particular faith 
(Assistant Chief Constable Maureen Brown of Central Scotland Police quoted 
in Goodwin, The Sun, 18 September 2007); 
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the press were keen to make links to the wider ‘terrorist network’: 
 
The double car bomb plot was not the work of a loner… experts believe those 
behind the foiled attack belong to one of the loosely interlocking cells (Smith, 
Townsend and Revill, The Observer, 1 July 2007). 
 
With reference to Mohammed Atif Siddique, we were told that the links that he was 
said to have made with other extremists are numerous. In the media post mortem it is 
the Internet which is perceived as being most influential in radicalizing the young, 
described quite poetically in The Daily Mail as ‘bedroom radicalisation’ (Capitanchik, 
18 September 2007), and is further reinforced by articles in The Times (e.g. Lister, 18 
September 2007). The representation of networks linking Islamists to a number of 
activities, groups and countries internationally extends the idea of a homogenised UK 
Muslim population into a wider association with Islamic radicals who have the primary 
motive of destroying the west. Discussing the effect of the wider Muslim network on 
apparently susceptible young minds, a report from The Observer states that 
‘Ultimately... it seems the suspects’ main influences came from overseas groups, the 
Deobandi and Wahhabi sects that have flourished in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan’ 
(Doward, Townsend, and McDonald, 8 July 2007). Further to this idea it is again 
suggested that all Muslims might be susceptible to radicalisation. If the 7/7 and 
Glasgow bombers were hard working, well educated and, until the event that took 
them to notoriety, law abiding, how can we possibly identify potential terrorists without 
pointing the finger at an entire community? So while the police investigation centred 
on individual criminality, the wider British press were keen to make links to the wider 
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terrorist network and if we consider Bunting’s comments in The Guardian, 
radicalisation of the younger generation is portrayed as a very real possibility. It is our 
contention that this discursive tension led the British media to make conflicting 
statements about the perpetrators and the wider terrorist network to which they 
appeared to be attached. 
 
The Evolution of a Limited Multiculturalism 
In light of our consideration of the mass media representation of 7/7 we believe that 
the symbolic construction of the bombers has created a difficult situation for supporters 
of British multiculturalism because the press has struggled to reconcile the need to 
represent Britain as a unified multicultural imagined community and other the bombers 
as Islamic radicals who were nonetheless normal British citizens. As a consequence 
the situation explained by Kellner (2004) in his work on media responses to 9/11 needs 
to be modified in order to account for the specific circumstances of the post 7/7 attacks. 
In Kellner’s account the American media’s response to 9/11 was entirely biased and 
apolitical. From the point of view of the American media there was no other way to 
understand the attacks on the Twin Towers, but as an act of irrational madness on the 
part of the terrorists. In this way politics was bracketed out of its interpretation of the 
acts. In his view the only real sources of critique came from the internet and marginal 
press. They not only sought to understand the roots of the event, but also consider 
Bush’s reaction to the attacks and the evolution of the war on terror. By contrast Kellner 
suggests that the European media provided a more balanced account of the events of 
9/11. Although it seems rather simplistic to say that the reason that the American 
media responded to 9/11 in the ways in which it did was because it was America that 
was under attack, and that the European media was able to adopt a more considered 
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approach to events because it had the luxury of a critical, but more essentially 
emotional, distance from the situation, our analysis of the British media’s response to 
7/7 shows that it is likely that this was in fact the case. Whilst there had been a clear 
anti-war movement from the British and European publics, the British media’s 
response to 7/7 was to bypass the politics of the suicide bombers and instead focus 
on their criminality in an attempt to save some sense of British multiculturalism by 
repeating the binary form of good Muslim / bad Muslim popularised by Bush / Blair 
following 9/1112.  
 
In this respect we argue that in much the same way that the American response to 
9/11 was about uniting a nation of immigrants and refounding an American imagined 
community in the face of an external enemy, the British media’s response to 7/7 was 
about refounding an idea of Britain as a tolerant multicultural society based on the 
democratic ideals of freedom and liberalism in the face of attacks by members of 
British society who were subsequently othered as deviants who had been 
brainwashed by foreign ideologues, ‘the mad mullahs’. In many respect this thesis 
mirrors suggestions made by Chomsky (1989) twenty years ago about the ways in 
which the American media controlled the representation of political events to the extent 
that it had the effect of minimising dissent in the wider population and reflects the kinds 
of analyses of the mass media offered by Neo-Marxist thinkers since the end of World 
                                                 
12 However, as our analysis reveals, the press did at least attempt to evaluate the motivations behind 
the attacks by asking just how and why inclusive British Muslims could do such a thing. The presentation 
of this discourse had two functions. First it allowed the press to demonstrate its commitment to the 
ideals of democratic process: the performance of reasonable liberalism against the irrationality of the 
Muslim other. The related effect of this was to assure the superiority of the British centre. While these 
discourses differed by degree between elements of the press, both narratives served to uphold the 
dominance of mainstream British authority. 
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War II. Chomsky’s sometimes co-writer, Herman further crystallised this idea when he 
said ‘…what the general public knows and is interested in is managed’ (1982: 144). 
 
In this context discourse is always necessarily political in nature. This key point 
enables us to escape the usual accusation levelled at writers like Chomsky that the 
mass media intends to deceive the public. Putting aside questions of media ownership, 
we understand that the mass media is not always conscious of the implicitly political 
nature of its presentations, but that rather because of the social, political, and cultural 
location of its producers, there is always an unconscious bias present in its reflections 
of reality. Influential discourse theorists Foucault (2004) and Said (1978) understood 
this perfectly well. Even when mass media producers try to present neutral accounts 
of political situations, they tend towards bias, simply because they cannot lift 
themselves out of their cultural location or mask their honest sympathies with people 
more like themselves than others who seem alien by comparison. In this regard the 
media discourse mirrored the political discourse, which struggled to overcome its 
imperial ideological roots. It is here, in this more complex understanding of discourse, 
that we confront the real significance of Foucault’s (2004) idea of biopolitics. Biopolitics 
refers to the ways in which we are governed through subtle control mechanisms, such 
as the feelings evoked by discourse, rather than the blunt instrument of police power. 
 
Post 7/7, such biopolitical discourse was demonstrated effectively in a number of 
speeches given by the ally leaders, Bush and Blair. Here we can argue that in many 
respects the responses to the London bombings were comparable to the rhetoric 
produced after 9/11. Consider George W. Bush’s speech after 7/7: 
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We don’t know who committed the attacks in London, but we do know that 
terrorists celebrate the suffering of the innocent…murder in the name of a 
totalitarian ideology that hates freedom, rejects tolerance and despises all 
dissent’ (Bush, 2005).  
 
Quite apart from the rhetorical use of the term ‘totalitarian’ with all its connotations of 
Stalinist USSR, we must remember that at this point Bush did not know who had 
attacked the Britain. How could he be sure it was a totalitarian regime? We would 
suggest that the answer to this question is that it did not really matter who had attacked 
Britain because the discursive framework – the us / them structure – was already 
largely in place post 9/11 and that whoever had eventually been unmasked as the 
perpetrators of the attacks would have slotted into that previously agreed structure in 
much the same way. On the rigid, post-political, nature of this discursive framework 
we can also consider Blair’s response to 7/7: 
The extremist propaganda is cleverly aimed at their target audience. It plays on 
our tolerance and good nature. It exploits the tendency to guilt of the developed 
world, as if it is our behaviour that should change, that if we only tried to work 
out and act on their grievances, we could lift this evil, that if we changed our 
behaviour, they would change theirs. This is a misunderstanding of a 
catastrophic order... In the end, it is by the power of argument, debate, true 
religious faith and true legitimate politics that we will defeat this threat (Blair, 
2005). 
In line with the argument that sees terrorism constructed as a problem caused by those 
outside neo-liberal regimes, here, no political alternative to warfare is presented. We 
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do not need to think about our conduct on the world stage. Rather, it is the terrorist, 
the unstable, insane, other, who needs to adjust his or her behaviour in order to fit into 
our society which is always correct. In this context, and as we have shown in our 
analysis of news reports post 7/7, it was clearly always important that the Islamic 
terrorist was represented as a deviant, rather than the representative of a particular 
political point of view, in order to save the possibility of multicultural order. George 
Bush clearly illustrates this point when he refers to the criminal nature of Islamic 
fundamentalism: 
 
The terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected 
by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics - a fringe movement 
that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam. The terrorists' directive 
commands them to kill Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans, and make no 
distinction among military and civilians, including women and children (Bush, 
2001). 
 
Given that such references to Islamic fundamentalism never mention the neo-colonial 
violence of the British and American nation states’ in Iraq and Afghanistan, should lead 
us to question whether these kinds of discursive representations are reflective of the 
racist core of contemporary British and American politics. In response to the continuing 
struggles over meaning between western political and media rhetoric and Muslim self-
construction, A. Sivanandan asserts: 
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White racial superiority is back on the agenda – in the guise, this time, not of a 
super-race but of a super-nation, a super-people, a chosen people on a mission 
to liberate the world (2006: 1). 
 
Herein resides the key point. The British and American political elites are keen to 
escape from political debate through the construction of a discourse which presents 
their cause as beyond discourse, driven by right, goodness, justice, and the care for 
humanity. By contrast, the others’ cause is not legitimate. They are evil. They want 
wickedness, injustice, and have no interest in the lives of other humans. Although 
there is a lot of talk about the nature of asymmetrical war, it is clear from countless 
studies that that we must also contend with the asymmetrical nature of discourse. In 
the context of contemporary discursive constructions surrounding Islamic terrorism 
there is no political debate. The law is upheld by the British and American neo-liberal 
capitalist states. Those who oppose these regimes are therefore criminal. Following 
Hall et al (1978) we suggest that this is why the British press has been so keen to 
present the individuals involved in domestic terrorist attacks since 7/7 in criminal 
terms. However, unlike the initial reportage surrounding 9/11 which explained the 
ethnic, un-American, otherness of the bombers, the British media could not easily 
sustain this practice in the wake of 7/7 because they could not afford to fracture the 
fragile story of British multiculturalism. The discourse surrounding key events and 
actors in the post 7/7 media and political deconstruction of terrorism have fixed the 
image of the disillusioned/extremist young Muslim male. Moving on from Hall et al’s 
framework, however, we must note that although the suicide bombers became 
criminalised others – bad Muslims – they could not be seen to represent the entire 
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Muslim population. Here we can again refer to Blair who argued vociferously on behalf 
of the majority good tolerant Muslims who abide by British law: 
 
…it is not generalised extremism. It is a new and virulent form of ideology 
associated with a minority of our Muslim community. It is not a problem with 
Britons of Hindu, Afro-Caribbean, Chinese or Polish origin. Nor is it a problem 
with the majority of the Muslim community. Most Muslims are proud to be British 
and Muslim and are thoroughly decent law abiding citizens. But it is a problem 
with a minority of that community, particularly originating from certain countries 
(Blair, 2006). 
 
Whilst stressing that most Muslims are law abiding citizens, Blair makes a clear 
connection between Muslims and extremist violence. At once the act of terrorism is 
divorced from its political root cause and becomes a matter of individual deviance. In 
order to better understand this as a discursive practice we might once again turn to 
Foucault (1988). This time we refer to his concept of the ‘dangerous individual’, which 
shows how social structures seek to target individual actors in times of crisis in order 
to secure wider social cohesion. Following this idea it becomes easier to see how post 
7/7 Islamist attacks have been subsumed by a narrative of individuation. For while it 
is convenient to locate some kind of inherent difference in a group of people (i.e. all 
Muslims), it is also problematic. How do we sustain the idea of multiculturalism if all 
Muslims are a potential threat to the safety of core Britain? Foucault’s (2001) study on 
madness proves valuable in assessing why the 7/7 suicide bombers were re-ordered 
as deviant individuals, rather than terrorists with a political agenda. Here it was widely 
suggested that because of their particular psycho-pathology the bombers were 
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perhaps more easily led by a manipulative leader – the extremist – who was an agent 
of the wider international terrorist network. Who, then, is the dangerous individual in 
this complex? While it is true to say that the suicide bombers actions were dangerous, 
because they caused the deaths of many people, we are led to the conclusion by the 
political and media discourse, that they were simply dupes in a more far-reaching and 
ideologically challenging terror network. While this may in fact be the case, the 
consequent discourse allows the political authorities to set about trying to undermine 
any legitimacy their claims may bear and put in place measures to combat further 
insurgence by restricting the freedoms of the wider Muslim and non-Muslim 
population.  
 
To support claims of the state, while at the same time undermining any real issues 
that the collective Muslim other might have, in the aftermath of 7/7 many parts of the 
British mass media adopted Blair’s use of the notion of the ‘acceptable’ Muslim in 
special reports and commentaries. In his post 7/7 commentary, Modood (2005) called 
them ‘corporate Muslims’. People said to represent the ‘real’ face of British Islam – 
liberal, tolerant, peaceful, and most importantly perhaps from an inclusive point of 
view, critical of fundamentalist readings of the Qur’an. What is clear, however, is that 
these largely educated, professional, middle-class, and westernised Muslims were 
allowed space to comment on events only by virtue of their inclusive characteristics 
and adherence to the dominant ideological discourse. In this respect British Islam was 
treated as totally inside multicultural society, whereas the deviant radicals were 
absolutely othered by virtue of their relationship to the international terror network, 
usually evoked through reference to al Qaeda as evidenced by representations of the 
Scottish bombers. The general effect of this practice has been to differentiate between 
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good (liberal) and bad (radical) Muslims in terms of religious practice and theological 
interpretations. Of course, we understand that the correct interpretation is the one 
supported by the neo-liberal western ideology. In this sanitised version, Islam is 
(fundamentally) a peaceful religion. The people who commit violence in its name are 
not only misinterpreting their religious doctrine, but also violently opposing the 
teachings of their chosen faith. The same is not true, of course, for those who commit 
violent acts in the name of Christianity.  
 
Again, the problem here is not that we need to condone violence, or accept that it is 
somehow justifiable, but rather understand the motivation for violence in political terms 
rather than simplify it as the actions of insane extremists. We do not believe that it is 
enough to simply say that the violent other is evil and that we are good. We believe 
that what is required is a political consideration of the roots of terrorism, the context of 
its setting, and the development of policy set on addressing those causes. As a 
consequence the main objective of our discussion of the discursive constructions of 
the war on terror post 7/7 has been to try to explode some of the representations which 
block the path to a thorough consideration of the politics of contemporary terrorism 
and prevent the emergence of proper debate about the roots of this violence.  
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